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DENNIS CHAVEZ AND
ROOSEVELT'S "COURT-PACKING" PLAN

llARRY A. CROUCH'"

~EN, on February 5,

1937, Franklin D. Roosevelt announced
his plan to enlarge the Supreme Court from nine to a maximum of
fifteen justices, the formation of public opinion, pro and con, began almost at once. There were mixed emotions concerning the
merits of the bill in both Houses of Congress, but the administration decided to introduce the measure in the Senate because Hatton W. Sumners, chairman of the House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee, was openly hostile. 1 Although Roosevelt undoubtedly expected opposition to his court "reform" from Republicans and conservative Democrats,2 he certainly planned on support from such staunch administration men as Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming, Torn Connally of Texas, Burton K. Wheeler
of Montana, and Carl A. Hatch and Dennis Chavez of New Mexico.
In this particular instance, however, the President made a major
political blunder. Men like O'Mahoney, Connally, and Wheeler
opposed the bill, Hatch tried in vain for a compromise, and even
Chavez remained noncommittal during the long struggle. To be,
sure, when the vote was finally taken on whether or not to recommit the court bill with all its amendments to the Senate judiciary
Committee, Chavez voted not to do so; thus, in effect, standing
with the President. By this time, though, the court-packing plan
'" I should like to thank Sister Viatora (Schuller), former President of the University of Albuquerque; Mr. Richard B. Edwards, State Representative from District
7, and Mr. Charles J. Villa for making this article possible.
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was assured of defeat and Chavez' vote was presumably calculated
to keep him in the good graces of the administration. There were,
understandably, other and more compelling reasons for Dennis
Chavez' relative inaction during the court reorganization fight and
he is a prime example of the approximately fourteen senators who
remained noncommittal on the issue throughout the senatorial
battle. 3
DENNIS CHAVEZ was born in the small farming community of Los
Chavez in Valencia County, New Mexico; on April 8, 1888. 4
Times were not easy for the family, because of the panic of 1893,
and in 1895 David Chavez moved them to Barelas, a suburb of Albuquerque. When young Dennis was only thirteen he was forced
to quit school and go to work as a grocery clerk to help out his
parents. While at this job the young boy made the acquaintance
of an engineer named Jim Gladding. Studying at night, Chavez
eventually became a surveyor and later on qualified as an engineer.
In 1906 Dennis left the grocery business 5 and took a job as assistant city engineer of Albuquerque, his boss being none other than
Gladding. Serving the city until 1915, Chavez helped to plan and
carry out some of Albuquerque's first municipal improvements.
During these years he also became interested in political affairs
and actively supported the Bernalillo County Democratic party,
renouncing the Republican party-and its patron system-of
which his father had been a lifelong member. 6
The turning point" in Chavez' life came in September 1917,
when Senator Anson, A. Jones of Las Vegas asked him to be his
secretary in Washington. This was almost certainly a reward for
his devoted campaign work for the senator in Rio Arriba and Taos
counties in the election of 1916. After working with Senator Jones
for six months he was appointed Assistant Executive Clerk for the
United States Senate. He attended Georgetown Law School at
night, graduating in 1920. Returning to Albuquerque he began
practicing law and served intermittently as a member of the
County and State Central Committees for the Democrats. These
activities assuredly aided him in political circles, for he was elected
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to the State House in 1922, receiving ~e largest electoral majority
in the city. He served only one term, but his rise in New Mexico
politics, with one brief exception, was continuous after that time.
When he returned to Albuquerque, Chavez opened his own law
office, specializing in criminal practice. In 1924 he was a delegate
to the Democratic National Convention. In 1930 Chavez went to
Washington for the second time as a member of the United States
House of Representatives, defeating Albert Simms by nearly
eighteen thousand votes. 7
The 1932 Democratic landslide across the nation was a boon
for Chavez, who was re-elected over Jose Armijo by 41,859 votes,
garnering 64.2 per cent of the total cast, thereby establishing himself as one of the outstanding Democrats in the state. By 1934,
after defeating George Cook for Democratic National Committeeman, Chavez felt ready to advance in the political hierarchy: He
chose to run for the Senate against the Progressive Bronson Cutting, the most powerful politician in the state. Cutting had supported Chavez in 1932.8
Cutting was indeed a formidable opponent for the aspiring
Chavez. First appointed to the Senate in 1927, he was elected as a
Republican in 1928. A wealthy Harvard graduate and Phi Beta
Kappa, Cutting came from Long Island but moved to New Mexico to seek a cure for tuberculosis. Not adverse to switching his
party allegiance, he supported the Democrats in 1930 and, especially Roosevelt, in 1932. Known as "EI Don," his power in New
Mexico derived from owning a leading newspaper; having a real
liking for the Spanish-American people and their culture; and being the head of a tough political machine. 9
The 1934 Senatorial campaign between Chavez and Cutting
was probably one of New Mexico's most notable state elections. It
was an uncommonly dirty campaign, even for New Mexico; both
sides apparently engaged in irregularities. The Roosevelt Administration was obviously backing Chavez, for it sent Postmaster Jim
Farley, Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, among others,
into the state. Cutting was the only Progressive the administration
opposed in 1934; he was extremely antagonistic toward Roosevelt's
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attempt to cut veterans' pensions and questioned the President's
humanitarianism. 10
Even before election day Senator James F.Byrnes, Democrat
from South Carolina, and chairman of the Senate committee to investigate campaign expenditures, stated that investigators had been
sent into New Mexico. They did not reveal which race was involved, but checked complaints concerning excessive campaign
outlays.ll The outcome of the contest was almost impossible to
predict because various groups such as labor, the Spanish-Americans, and even the Republicans were divided. When it was all
over Cutting emerged the victor by the· thin margin of 1,284
votes. 12
Confident that he had won, Chavez, with administration support, was ready to contest the election. The State Canvassing
Board certified Cutting's victory and the State Supreme Court
then rejected Chavez' request to grant an order to the Canvassing
Board to throw out returns from a number of precincts in fifteen
counties. Chavez was still not finished. On February 25, 1935, he
filed a formal petition before the Senate, disputing the result of the
election. The issue was undecided when Cutting, returning from
New Mexico where he had gone to collect affidavits dealing with
the contest, was killed in an airplane crash on May 6. Governor
Clyde Tingley wasted no time in appointing Chavez to the Senate on May 1 I. As Chavez was sworn in, five Progressives, all
friends of Cutting, walked out of the Senate chamber, but the new
member ignored them and took his seat. The charges against Cutting were later dropped and he was fully vindicated. 13
In 1936 New Mexico voters elected Chavez for the remainder
of Cutting's unexpired term, over Judge Manuel A. Otero, Jr. by
about twenty thousand votes. Until the court fight in 1937 Senator
Chavez consistently voted for New Deal measures and in all likelihood seemed to be permanently in the Roosevelt fold. With the
assistance the administration had provided in 1934 and 1935, as
well as his record on bills in the Senate, FDR had almost every
reason to believe that Chavez would not fail to support the struggle
to reorganize the Supreme Court.
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Undoubtedly Chavez was as astounded by the President's February 5 message as was the rest of Congress. By February 13 the
Albuquerque Journal was chiding Chavez for not taking a stand
on the court bill. This was partly due to New Mexico Representative John J. Dempsey's statement that he opposed the Supreme
Court proposals but favored the lower court reforms. The Santa
Fe New Mexican, after praising Dempsey, stated its hope "that
New Mexico's two senators will also have enough intestinal
fortitude to stand by the American system of government, regardless of the club." 14 The Artesia Advocate reported that Chavez was
leaning toward the bill, although there seems to be no foundation
for this statement, and that his colleague, Carl A. Hatch, was noncommittal. 15
The New Mexico State Legislature hurriedly passed a resolution approving the court reform plan. Only four senators opposed
it and no representatives; moreover, the Governor, Clyde Tingley,
stood firmly behind Roosevelt. 16 The Journal editorialized that it
was doubtful whether the resolution would carry much weight
with New Mexico's members in Congress, "but it might hasten
Senators Hatch and Chavez into voicing their attitudes on the
court plans." And again on February 17 it stated: "New Mexico
has been awaiting the opinions of our Senators on the issues.
Nearly all their colleagues have by this time expressed their views
in one manner or another. The silence of New Mexico's senators
is singular."1T The Las Vegas Daily Optic was extremely upset because it thought that public opinion had been completely disregarded in the state legislature's support of the court bill. 1s The
Roswell Record had little faith in Hatch and Chavez, saying:
"Enough is known to indicate that they will do whatever the
President wishes them to do, on this matter or on other matters."
It believed the better elements would oppose the plan and the
newer and inexperienced senators would support FDR. And although the bill faced a hard fight in the Senate, the Record predicted its probable passage. 19
Replying to a constituent who was then in New York, Chavez
said concerning the court proposal: "This matter is of extreme im-
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portance and I am not arriving at conclusions impulsively. Will
try to do my duty conscientiously and patriotically." Other people
were not to be put off so easily, however, and a New York lady opposed to the measure wrote a second letter to the Senator because
his first "reply was delightfully non-committal-and today's paper
lists you as one of those who 'will probably go along with the Presiden.t '''20
Even at this early date Chavez was most certainly under pressure from all sides to take a definite position on the court bill.
Newspapers either listed him as leaning toward the plan or being
undecided, but his correspondence shows no evidence of any commitment. He advised a New Jersey couple in a standard reply that
he would "not make a hasty decision on the [Supreme Court]
matter, but that when I do decide I sincerely hope and trust that
I will make such a decision as is to the best possible interest to the
American people and in keeping with the duties of my office, and
without fear of future votes and political reprisals."21 Nothing
could have been more evasive and this was to be the general tone
of his statements, privately and publicly, for the remainder of the
fight.
The Senatorial battle lines formed rather quickly. By February
23 the Senate count was forty for the bill and thirty-seven against.
This tabulation, however, did not include nineteen uncommitted
senators and a deeper analysis hinted at forty~eight against, fortysix for, and two determinedly on the fence. The President's bill
was already in trouble, and there is every reason to believe, because
of the nature of the attack and the institution involved, that the
measure never had a chance of being passed. In an attempt to encourage retirement by Supreme Court justices, and with a very
dim hope of breaking the executive-judicial impasse, the Senate,
by a seventy-six to four vote, passed the Sumners-McCarran Supreme Court Justices Retirement Bill which allowed judges to retire at full pay, if they had served ten years, when they reached
the age of seventy. Chavez voted for it. 22
By March Chavez had changed his tune only slightly. In a
typical letter to a California man he was as equivocal as ever: "I
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have definite ideas on the subject," he wrote, ''but due to the fact
that this matter is so grave, I find myself reluctant to make a
decision in haste, and will not decide without further consideration."23 Speaking at a victory day dinner in Staunton, Virginia, on
March 4, Chavez straddled the fence in his only public utterance
during the I 68-day fight. Praising both the President and those
senators who opposed him in the court matter he stated:
Last fall it was the "rubber-stamp" Congress that the American
people were asked to defeat. However,· it is the Democratic Members of both houses of Congress who are courageously voicing their
convictions that it is unwise to add more judges to our Supreme
Court. By paradox, strangely enough, through an expression of their
opinions these Democratic Senators and Congressmen demonstrate
to the world the utter absurdity and assinine [sic] ridiculousness of
those unkind opponents of the President's proposal who shamelessly
hurl against him the charge of dictator.
We as Democrats, irrespective of our stand on this issue, can pride
ourselves that of all our statesmen who are attacking the proposal,
none have doubted our great leader's sincerity. None fear abuse on
his part should he be entrusted with the appointment, with the advice and consent of the Senate of additional judges. They do not fear
a Democrat in the White House. It is future abuse that they fear. 24

In an editorial on Chavez' Staunton speech the Santa Fe N e~
Mexican said that it was "a hopeful augury that the New Mexico
Senator has not yet endorsed the court packing proposal, and that
he apparently can discern the dangerous precedent." 25
The administration now started a concentrated campaign to get
the undecided behind the court plan. James Roosevelt sent Mary
W. Dewson a list of the senators who had not declared themselves
and who "should be impressed." Chavez, along with nine others,
was listed as leaning toward an increase in the Supreme Court.
New Mexico was also singled out as one of the "key states for
propaganda."26 The administration no doubt hoped that Chavez
would be swamped with letters favoring the court plan.
If the New Mexico Senator had taken a position on the reorganization bill, it was still not evident in his correspondence. "I
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have definite ideas on the subject," he wrote to a New Mexican
then in Texas in what could be called a form letter, "but due to the
fact that this matter is so grave, I find myself reluctant to make a
decision in haste, and will not decide without further consideration."27 Chavez was probably starting to feel uneasy concerning his
position. On the one hand he felt a strong allegiance to the administration because of all the help it had given him, but on the
other he possibly believed that the court bill was wrong, and his
mail showed a definite trend that the people were positively opposed. The Senate Judiciary Committee had begun its hearings on
March 10 and for a while public attention was focused on that
body. The Magdalena News reported that the committee was said
to be evenly divided on the Supreme Court bill "with Hatch, from
New Mexico, never before hardly heard of in Washington, suddenly made important by being able to switch the recommendation of the committee either way." Then in a ruthless editorial it
stated that "Hatch, it is said, is profiting by the example of his colleague, Chavez, by demanding plenty of New Mexico patronage
in return for his vote in committee on the court packing scheme."
Carl A. Hatch had not been as silent as his friend on the court
issue. He advocated an amendment to the original bill which
would have restricted appointments to one each year. In an editorial the Roy Record stated: "Now, if Senator Chavez, Comes
forth with a statement indicating he is for the Hatch plan a lot of
us are due for a heart attack sure enough."28
Chavez' reluctance to make some kind of statement did not
cause his mail to abate. In fact, from March until the court bill
was recommitted in late July his mail increased. It was almost impossible for the New Mexico solon to dismiss it lightly, for the
overwhelming majority of his correspondents opposed the President's plan. A good many people believed the only solution was to
submit the bill in the form of a constitutional amendment. Robert
P. Noble of Port Chester, New York, wrote late in April: ". . . I
note you are still listed as among those honorable men who are
withholding alliance with the Party Chieftains, awaiting I presume, the sentiment of the country at large before definitely com-
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mitting yourself." Noble suggested that "the tide, while never at
ebb, is now Rowing fully in favor of a Constitutional Amendment
swelled by a great majority of real true Americans." And even a
well-known radical like Gerald B. Winrod of Wichita, Kansas;
wrote that "Christians of the United States" were opposed to any
change, increase, or compromise on the President's bill and it
should be defeated "in its entirety." 29
If Chavez was affected by letters of this type, and there were
many of them, he certainly did not display' it in any recognizable
form. Answering F. O. Sandstrom's letter opposing the court re~
form Chavez noted the question is "a very grave one, and I do not
believe it would be consistent with the duties of my office to make
a decision in haste, and I will not decide until the matter has been
thoroughly considered."30 This vacillation may have been due in
part to conflicting reports coming out of his own state. In late
February a newspaper poll in Curry County revealed 530 people
against and 340 in favor of the court bill. However, the farmers
in this county endorsed Roosevelt's plan. A poll taken by the
Clovis Evening News-Journal showed that a majority in that city
apparently favored the plan. Later on another count listed the people as overwhelmingly opposed. In March the Artesia Advocate
reported that twenty newspapers in the state were against the bill,
four supported it, and a number were noncommittal. By April
though, the New Mexico Sentinel stated that ninety per cent of
the papers in the state were in opposition. 3!
All the lawyers' associations in Albuquerque were opposed to
the plan, as was the national American Bar Association. The Albuquerque Lawyers Club voted thirty-three to ten; the local ABA
chapter poll showed forty-three to nine; and the Junior Bar Association was unanimously against. Later on the newly formed
Lea County Bar Association joined the opposition. In an editorial
the Roy Record stated that even though Hatch and Chavez were
members of the bar fraternity they were "sort of sympathetic to
the plan." It also believed that Jim Farley's threat of a loss of patronage to those who deserted the President would "no doubt have
a lot of effect on senators of the ilk of those who are supposed to
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represent the people of New Mexico." Farley, it is interesting to
. note, had also been making speeches all over the country constantly predicting the "court bill was in the bag," when, of course; it
was not. The administration forces were split over the effectiveness
of these speeches, and when pressed for the names of any senators
they had influenced, the pro-Farley faction could produce only the
name of Dennis Chavez. 32
According to a Gallup Poll published on May 24, fifty to fiftytwo per cent of the people in New Mexico were against the President's attempt to "reform" the Supreme Court. It also listed
Chavez for and Hatch against the bill. One writer has said that,
except for organized urban labor, the rural inhabitants of the
Southeast, the South, and the Southwest and "poorest in economic
ability and lowest in library development" became the most avid
supporters of the President's proposal,33
From late March through April and May Roosevelt received
numerous setbacks in his effort to enlarge the Court. First of all,
in a series of decisions the Supreme Court upheld a Washington
state minimum wage law for women; the revised Frazier-Lemke
Farm Mortgage Moratorium Law; sections of the Railway Labor
Act which required railroads to engage in collective bargaining;
and lastly the National Labor Relations Act. The Court's new outlook combined with the dual blow of May 18 thoroughly finished
the court bill. On that date the Senate Judiciary Committee voted
ten to eight to report the reorganization plan unfavorably, and Justice Willis Van Devanter announced he would retire on June 2,
the end of the Court's term. A few days later when the Court
sustained the Social Security Act, many believed that enlargement
of the Supreme Court was no longer necessary.
On June 14 the Senate Judiciary Committee delivered the
coup de grace. In its adverse report the Committee stated in its
summary: "It is a measure which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again be presented to the free
representatives of the free people of America." Roosevelt, who
had adamantly refused even to consider a compromise up to this
time, now had no choice and the final drive for a substitute court
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bill was begun. In preparation for the showdown Senate Majority
Leader Joseph Robinson, who was to lead the fight, made a list of
where each senator would probably stand. Chavez was listed as
"pretty sure pro."34 This prediction proved correct when the final
vote was taken.
On July 6 the debate on the compromise bill opened on the
Senate Hoor. Two days later Senator Marvel M. Logan of Kentucky made loyalty to the President the criterion for support of the
new bill. He stated that those senators who had opposed FDR on
the original measure had demonstrated their ingratitude. to the
President because he had helped to elect most of them. In reply
Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, the man who had led the opposition, brought up the Cutting controversy of 1934 and 1935 which
eventually brought Dennis Chavez into the fr~y. "Many of us, instead of coming in on the coattails of the President," snapped
Wheeler, "helped to nominate Mr. Roosevelt in the convention
of 1932." In fact, he had known men "who left their party in order
to support" FDR. "Then I saw the present administration send
speakers to New Mexico to fight the late Senator Cutting, notwithstanding the fact that he had left his party to campaign" for
Roosevelt. The reason for this, he added, was because Cutting had
disagreed with the chief executive concerning the overriding of
his veto, on the Soldiers' Bonus Bill. The reference to Cutting's
last race brought Chavez to his feet. Wheeler may know about
politics in the Northwest, the New Mexican replied, but he knew
little about the politics of the Southwest and New Mexico. He
said he had helped nominate FDR in 1932 by being partly instrumental in getting the state delegation instructed for him and even
before that had promoted the President's nomination. In his final
comment Chavez showed quite clearly he had not forgotten the
help the administration had given him in his race and contested
election with Bronson Cutting in 1934 and 1935:
Without minimizing in the least the virtues of my predecessor, he did
not help to nominate President Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, his
representatives were at the other convention helping to nominate Mr.
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Hoover. So I know that the President . . . should not be accused of
ingratitude because, he dares, in his own way, to try to help those
who helped nominate him at the Chicago convention.35

Chavez' correspondence indicates that the people who wrote to
him were definitely· against the compromise measure. The Citizens' Committee for Court and Constitution listed him among the
twelve "doubtful" senators who should be written to by those who
opposed the new bill. Even Ignatius M. Wilkinson, Dean of the
Fordham University School of Law, who had appeared before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, in opposition to the original bill,
wrote Chavez urging him to vote against the substitute plan. But,
as with Roosevelt's original bill, Chavez was not going to commit
himself in any way. His standard replies were that he still had
"an open mind on the subject," or that "you may be sure that your
suggestions will be considered." Although no one knew for certain which way he would go until the roll was called, the Clovis
Evening News-Journal, on July 10, listed him as having spoken
publicly for the original or compromise bill. In his column in the
Alhuquerque Journal E. Dana Johnson wrote that the paper was
informed that Chavez, "regarded as a key-man in the fate of the
Administration judiciary-abolishment program, is being overwhelmed with letters and telegrams urging him to stand by the
Constitution and the American system of the independent court,
as the crisis in the packery fight nears." Hoping this was true,
Johnson said that if he had not been deluged with messages he
soon would be. "If Senator Chavez proves big enough to divorce a
crisis in government from a transitory political line-up, and act as
he would were no partisanship involved, we have little doubt
where he will stand; but that is a large order." In an ending admonishment Johnson wrote: "In historical perspective, the partisan
politics of those who voted for or against this measure will soon be
forgotten in history. And history has been made by men able to
rise above 'organization' loyalties-not by politicians." 36
With the death of Senator Robinson on July 14 the substitute
bill had no chance whatsoever of passing. Extreme political
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maneuvering, even during his funeral, resolved the issue. The
Judiciary Committee met at ten o'clock on July 22 and after much
debate Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming wrote on a memo: "No
change in S.C.-No Proctor-No roving judge."37 When the Senate convened a little after noon Senator Logan .of Kentucky moved
to recommit the original bill with all its amendments to the Judiciary Committee. The vote was seventy in favor and twenty against.
Chavez was among those who voted no. He had finally cast his lot
with the President. On that same day he had written O. S. Evans
of Shiprock, New Mexico: "As yet I have not made a decision on
this matter for I believe that every phase of the question should be
carefully considered before a decision is made and I also think that
a hasty decision might be detrimental to our Nation and State."3S
After I 68 days of tense battle the court fight was over at last.
A New Mexico newspaper had to have its say though. In a
scathing editorial, the Albuquerque Journal said that although the
bill was dead it was not because of New Mexico's two senators,
who had stood by the President when the proposal faced certain
defeat. Hatch's vote was expected, because he had signed the
compromise, but Chavez, "who had remained noncommittal on the
various measures through the long controversy and was one of the
few who had not openly stated his position, could easily have
chosen to vote with the majority in embalming the 'slow degree'
court plan." Instead, he chose to support FDR "and thus perhaps
ingratiate himself in the favor of the Administration." Indeed the
two senators were free from reprisals and "ought to be set for a
flow of patronage in payment for their 'valiant' efforts." 39
Why indeed did Dennis Chavez remain noncommittal during
the court bill fight and then finally support the President? Whichever position he took he surely had reasons for justifying it. If he
had decided to oppose the bill, his correspondence would have
probably been a major reason for his so doing. Of those letter-writers who were not Chavez' constituents the count ran four hundred
and sixty-four against the original bill to three for it. The out-ofstaters were even more strongly against the compromise, the count
being one hundred and sixty-one opposed with no one in support.
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From his own electorate ninety-six were against the original measure while only one favored it. In equal disfavor, the compromise
plan lost twenty-three to one. 40 This, plus thefact that many of the
New Mexico newspapers were in opposition, would seem to have
been sufficient reason for voting against the bill.
On the other hand there is one important, yet seemingly unrelated, factor that just possibly compelled Chavez finally to support the President. This factor was not patronage, and it must be
said that there is no evidence to indicate it ever entered the picture
in relation to Chavez' final decision. Mter the retirement of Justice Willis Van Devanter many men were mentioned as possible
appointees to fill the vacancy. One of the more prominent names
that cropped up was Sam G. Bratton, former senator from New
Mexico, and a Federal Circuit Judge. 41 Most of the state's newspapers, if not all, favored the appointment of Bratton and their
editorials strongly urged it. 42 What they failed to realize, because
they could afford to be idealists instead of realists, was that it is
very doubtful whether Roosevelt would have given Bratton a second thought if Chavez, or even Hatch, had voted against him.
And, of course, Chavez was also deeply indebted to the administration for all the backing it had given him in past years. To desert
Roosevelt, regardless of the Bratton appointment, might have
seemed to Chavez paramount to treason, and no matter what happened he could not force himself to leave the fold.
Prior to Van Devanter's resignation Chavez was still in a quandary about what to do. His mail showed that people were strongly
opposed to increasing the Supreme Court, but the administration's
hold was strong enough to make it impossible for him to take a
definite stand and get caught in the middle. This is precisely one
reason why Roosevelt lost the battle: In the later stages of the
struggle the administration forces could always count on at least
forty-four senators, but beyond that they had to go to men like
Chavez an~ could never be entirely certain, despite the influence
they believed they had on such senators, that these men would not
vote against the bill. 43
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In any case, Chavez is an excellent example of the senator who
was able to keep from becoming deeply committed in the long
fight. Whatever his reasons for supporting the President, he was
no doubt able to justify them fully, for most certainly he had
given the issue long and careful consideration.
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